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STUDENT NOTES
CONSTTUTONAL LAW - INcOmE TAx - HusBAND AND WI=E
AS TAXABL-E UNIT. - A statute1 provided that, as to persons liv-
ing together as members of a family, the income of the wife and
of each child under eighteen should be assessed as that of the
husband or head of the family, and that a tax should be paid on
the aggregate amount according to the applicable graduated rate.
H married a widow with separate property and a separate income
from a partnership of which she was a member; he seeks to re-
cover the excess of the tax paid over that which he would have
had to pay on his own income alone. The state court sustained
1
Wis. STAT. (1929) § 71.05 (2) (d). The act provided for rates graduated
with reference to the size of the income up to $12,000, with a flat rate of six
per cent. on amounts in excess of $12,000. Wis. STAT. (1929) § 71.06. How-
ever, spouses could make separate returns 't their option, or a single joint
return. In either case the tax was to be computed on the combined average
taxable income, exemption allowed but once and divided equally between
them, and a tax paid by each in the proportion that the average income of
each bore to the combined average income. Wis. STAT. (1929) § 71.09 (4)
(c.).
1
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the assessment.2 Held, that the tax violated due process. Judg-
ment reversed. Hoeper 'v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin!
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, in which Mr.
Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone concur, sets forth the pre-
ferable viewpoint. Upon the lowest argumentative level, the
statute might have been sustained as a preventative measure
against fraudulent evasions of surtaxes by colorable transfers of
property among members of a family.' The majority, citing
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,' state that tax evils may not be reached
by a blanket regulation which is unconstitutional. Certainly in
view of the eminent dissenters, it cannot be assumed categorically
that this regulation is unconstitutional and, therefore, inappro-
priate for the prevention of tax evasions. One need not inquire
of accountants to learn about the within-the-law manipulations of
clients.' Almost every case before the Board of Tax Appeals, pur-
porting to involve an essentially different situation, is illustrative.
The majority state that married women's acts have destroyed
2 Hoeper v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 202 Wis. 493, 233 N. W. 100 (1930).
52 S. Ct. 120 (1931); comments in (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 374 and (1932)
45 1HAv. L. RaV. 740.
' This was one of the grounds of the state court's decision, supra n. 2.
The statute was first sustained upon this ground twenty years ago in Income
Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673, 135 N. W. 164 (1912). It is im-
material that the husband and wife in the Hoeper case enjoyed bona fide
separate incomes, for it has often been decided that administrative necessity
may justify the inclusion of innocent transactions within a prohibited class,
msupra n. 3, at 123, 124. Cf. Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.
S. 192, 33 S. Ct. 44 (1912).
8270 U. S. 230, 46 S. Ct. 260 (1926) (invalidating a statute which, for
purposes of inheritance tax, classified all gifts inter vivos, effective within
six years of death, as gifts made in contemplation of death).
'Some possible manipulations are as follows: (1) the husband creates a
revocable trust under which the income from property is paid to the wife for
life, remainder over to children, but this income was held validly taxed to the
grantor-husband in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 50 S. Ct. 336 (1930);
(2) so-called "'wash" sales of stock to create deductible losses for the pur-
pose of income tax returns, e. g., X sells stock, which he purchased for $10,000,
for $2,000, reports a loss of $8,000 and a few days later buys the same stock
back at virtually the same price for which he sold; this situation is now
expressly covered by the Revenue Act of 1928, § 118, disallowing deduction
for alleged loss on sale of stock or securities where substantially identical
property is repurchased within 30 days before or after such sale date; (3)
A, the sole owner of a prosperous business, forms a partnership including B,
his wife, and minor children, C and D, dividing the profits equally. A files
a separate return as does B both for herself and as guardian for the children
and high surtaxes are avoided. It is said the government has never questioned
such returns; (4) A, B and C are stockholders in a corporation making large
profits; they set up a partnership, composed of their wives, which becomes the
selling agency for the product of the corporation by contract, thereby reducing
the profits of the original corporation which the husbands report as dividends
and getting a large part of the income into the partnership where it becomes
distributable to the wives who file separate income tax returns.
2
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the former economic identity of husband and wife, and becloud
the issue with the proposition that one person may not be taxed
for the property of another. Long ago Mr. Justice Holmes dis-
tinguished between the practical effect of the husband's power
and its legal ground," and in his answer here that "usually each
would get the benefit of the income of each without inquiry into
the source" he suggests the real issue of treating the family as
an economic unit and the basis of a reasonable classification for
tax purposes.' Although both are comparatively recent develop-
ments, the chronological connection is probably the only one that
exists between giving married women property rights and assess-
ing income taxes." Statutes enacted to release married women from
subjection to marital power seem irrelevant where no question of
protection is involved."
Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 311, 31 S. Ct. 425 (19il), (suit to quiet title
where statute provided both husband and wife must join in conveyances of
realty acquired during coverture; held, that deed of husband alone is inef-
fectual to convey community property even though acquired prior to passage
of the act. Certainly where, as here, legal title is involved, the legal ground
is important, but where taxation is involved, the practical effect of the hus-
band's power becomes all important).
9The majority state that "Iit can hardly be claimed that a mere difference
in social relations so alters the taxable status of one receiving income as
to justify a different measure for the tax," 7upra n. 3, at 122. Why not? In
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 40 S. Ct. 2 (1919) an inheritance tax upon
the estate of a non-resident decedent, the rate of which was determined by
the combined value of local and foreign assets, was sustained. In (1932)
45 HA.v. L. Rv. 740 it is argued from this case that " I just as the advantage
of owning property makes it reasonable to take that property into account
in determining a rate, even though the state is powerless to tax its devolution
directly, so here the advantage derived from a spouse's income makes an
analagous determination reasonable. However, it is questionable wheher the
economic advantages resulting to one spouse from the other's income are
sufficient to justify the statute insofar as it provided that the head of a family
should be taxable for the incomes of members." The Bureau of Internal Reve.
nue has recently defined "head of a family" as a taxpayer, who may be
single, who supports in one household one or more persons over whom he
exercises family control, based on some moral or legal obligation to do so,
as widower supporting in one household an aged mother and a daughter. It
was decided that such a person is entitled to the same Federal income tax
exemption of $3,500 as a married person. If such exemption be allowed, is
it not reasonable that such "'head of a family" should bear a tax burden
according to the combined income of the members thereof? N. Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1932.
9 "But taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as
it is with actual command over property taxed-the actual benefit for which
the tax is paid. If a man directed his bank to pay over income as received
to a servant or friend, until further orders, no one would doubt that he could
be taxed upon the amounts so paid. It is answered that in that case he would
have a title, whereas here he did not. But from the point of view of taxation
there would be no difference." Mr. Justice Holmes in Corliss v. Bowers,
supra n. 6.
10A similar classification has been made in England both with respect to
3
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The tkeatment of husband and wife under the Federal in-
come tax law demonstrates the inapplicability of the fundamental
proposition of the majority to this situation. Apparently it was
only in community property states that the government attempted
to collect a higher tax from the husband upon the basis of the
combined income of husband and wife. In U. S. v. Robbins" at-
torneys on both sides thought the proper method of approaching
the problem was to ascertain the nature of the wife's interest in
community income in California by finding what rights of owner-
ship she might exercise over it. It was decided that the whole in-
come from community property was assessable to the husband
since the wife's interest there was a mere expectancy and the
husband was in fact the owner of the community property during
the life of the community. Mr. Justice Holmes said then "even
if we are wrong as to the law of California and assume the wife
had an interest in community income that Congress could tax if
so minded, it does not follow that Congress could not tax the hus-
band for the whole." Of course, Congress had never said ex-
pressly that the husband should be so taxed." California prompt-
ly passed a statute to avoid this result,' and in a series of recent
decisions1 ' it was held that in all the community property states in
question, including California as to which an anomalous result
was reached,' the wife has such a present vested interest that she
is entitled to be treated as the owner for the purpose of filing a
the rights of married women, 45 & 46 VICT. c. 75, § 1 (1882), and the assess-
ment of the wife's income to the husband, 17 & 18 GEo. 5, c. 10, § 42 (9b)
(1927).
269 U. S. 315, 46 S. Ct. 148 (1926) (California).
2Al the revenue acts have simply provided that every individual with a
certain income shall file a return, e. g., the Revenue Act of 1928, § 51. The
Treasury Department has twice suggested to Congress without success that
the husband be taxed upon the whole community income.
13CAL. CIVIL CODE, § 161a, effective July 29, 1927, "the respective interests
of the husband and wife in community property during continuance of the
marriage relation are present, existing and equal interests under the manage-
ment and control of the husband ..... This section shall be construed as
defining the respective interests and rights of husband and wife in community
property." 1
2 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930) (Washington);
Goodell v. Koch, 282 U. S. 118, 51 S. Ct. 62 (1930) (Arizona); Hopkins v.
Bacon, 282 U. S. 122, 51 S. Ct. 62 (1930) (Texas); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.
S. 127, 51 S. Ct. 64 (1930) (Louisiana); U. S. v. Malcolm, 282 U. S. 792, 51
S. Ct. 184 (1931) (California).
1M received a salary of $3,600 which under the California law was com-
munity income and, therefore, M and his wife are each permitted to file a
separate return for one-half. U. S. v. Malcolm, supra n. 14. Thus a highly
paid executive may escape his just surtax burden, he returns one-half the
salary, the wife one-half, although he earns it all.
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1932], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol38/iss3/7
STUDENT NOTES
separate income tax return covering one-half the community in-
come. With one possible exception the Federal government has
a uniform policy now in both community property and other
states. Up to June 26, 1922, the Treasury Department permitted
a husband and wife, who had originally elected to file a joint re-
turn, to file amended separate returns, but on that date a con-
trary ruling was made, so that now they may have to pay a higher
tax based on their aggregate income."
If it be said that the Hoeper case, in which Mr. Justice
Roberts also wrote the majority opinion, stands for uniformity in
state and federal income tax administration, the answer is simply
that the only desirable uniformity is as to the federal law. The
state of Wisconsin has said expressly that the husband shall be so
taxed and has applied this law for over twenty years. It would
seem that the "benign" attitude evinced so recently toward other
legislation might have permitted Wisconsin to continue to tax
incomes in this manner.'
-BERNARD SCLOVE.
CONTEMPT OF COURT - FALSIFICATioN OF EVIDENCE. - A
federal judge sitting in New York deplores the loose ideas of
testifying now current in our courts and the numerous perjuries
on the witness stand that escape notice.1 Rather than stop short
with deprecatory remarks regarding this evil, as other juristic
commentators are prone to do, he proceeded to sentence a witness
who had perjured himself for contempt of court. The witness, J.
D., had testified that he was on board a certain scow at the time
of its sinking and that he had seen the accident. Two other wit-
nesses testified that they had met J. D. when he arrived on the
scene of the disaster, and at that time he was first informed of the
sinking of the scow. J. D. thereupon confessed that he had lied,
and the judge held him in contempt of court for having wilfully
testified falsely. The Dunnigan Sisters.'
Whether perjury can be summarily punished as contempt of
court is a question which often arises. The cases seem to agree
1" The Revenue Act of 1928, § 51 (b) (1) and (2). See also Sol. Op. 90,
TreasurT Dept. Cumulative Bull. No. 4, p. 236 (June 1921).
Y70'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51
S. Ct. 130 (1931); (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 374.
"The Dunnigan Sisters, 53 F. (2d) 502 (D. C., S. D. X. Y., 1931).
Ibid.
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